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Abstract: 
 
Chadian government’s decision to integrate officials in 2009 to banking sectors should 
promote financial development firstly and then to give visibility in the government 
expenditures. The purpose of this article is to highlight the implications of capitalization and 
bank risk management on financial development in Chad before and after the banking 
(financial inclusion) of Chadian officials. To achieve this goal, we used Generalized Method of 
moment (GMM) and the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) estimators on truncate data 
from Chadian banks during the period 2000-2015. As result, Chadian banks recapitalize to 
reduce bank risks, while risks negatively affect financial development before the start of the 
banking process. During the period of the mass banking and despite the risk inherent to 
Chadian customers, the recapitalization of the banks however improved in weak proportion 
the financial development in Chad.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Chad, among other CEMAC1 countries (Cameroon and Gabon) have a low level of financial 
development. Resilience between the real and financial sector remains despite the 
international interconnections of financial systems absent in Chad. While the COBAC2 reports 
                                                          
 PhD candidate in Economics at the University of Dschang (Cameroon). Email : 
djimoudjiel_djekonbe@yahoo.fr 
1 CEMAC: Economic Commission of Central African States uniting six countries (Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Chad). 
2 Banking Commission of Central African States created in 1992’s to ensure banking prudential regulation 
individually and to grant agreement to banks (and all other financial institutions) for exercising in the 
community. 
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(2004 and 2008) held a low concentration and therefore a significant competitive situation. 
Studies on the SCP (Structure Behavior-Performance) model led to the conclusion that 
banking behavior is subject to or sensitive to prudential standards (Dietsch, 1992). Prudential 
norms that were once adopted after the plethora crises in financial systems around the world 
have enabled banks to devise appropriate strategies that can reduce post-crisis costs.  
Nevertheless, the objective here is not to allow the banks to states as "pyromaniac 
firefighters" but to become aware of the harmful effects of crises on economic activity in 
general. Prudential standards adopted at the Basel meetings (I and II and its current 
extensions) revolve all around the recapitalization of banks and the respect of prudential 
ratios. For the CEMAC microprudential regulatory management authority, COBAC, the banks 
are required to comply with Basel's international prudential standards, to respect the holding 
of capital above at least 8% of their risk-weighted assets. Alongside to hold minimum 
regulatory capital of at least 10 billion francs, banks must accompany the proper monitoring 
of prudential standards prudential ratios (capital ratio, liquidity, transformation and 
immobilization). However, the change in capital is not without effect on the economy because 
it has already been judged by economists to follow economic trend or conjuncture. Capital 
banking evolution has been highlighted from several angles by previous works, linking it in 
most cases with bank risks and returns ( (Ouédraogo R., 2011); (Ouédraogo, 2014); 
(Djimoudjiel, 2018)). Given the recapitalization channel, bank capital has a discretionary part 
evolving with bank profitability. Discretionary capital is that part conditioned by the annuities 
of the assets of the bank. Indeed, the vast majority of banks increase the level of their 
capitalization based on the margins generated on their liquid assets. An improvement in the 
capital of banks explains a favorable economic situation for sustained growth. From 
(Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache, 1998) point of view, a period of recession (decline in GDP) 
leads to the deterioration of the quality of bank loans and the rise of banking risks or defaults. 
In other terms, bank capital conditions (is related to financial development process) the 
process of financial development.  
Recently in 2016, Garba’s work confirm in the case of sub-Saharan African countries, the 
effects of bank capitalization standards on reducing the risks of macroeconomic default. In 
the same case, WAEMU countries are also particularly exposed to the positive effects of bank 
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capital on mitigating the risk of default (Ouédraogo, 2014). Extensions of the same work also 
discussed the implications of these standards for financing economies. The countries of 
CEMAC, and in particular Chad, are those despite systemic risk tendencies (risk design 
according to Bordes (2013)), fewer studies are available to the public. In Chad, starting in 
2009, the government's decision to fund Chadian officials has given banks new impetus in 
managing client risks and “bad debts”. In addition to the traditional activity of providing 
loanable funds, banks will increase their profits and create the attractiveness of the financial 
system in general through new banking products and services. 
However, subject to recapitalization and standards, did Chadian banks really accompany the 
economic system after the banking system of Chadian officials and householders? However, 
have the prudential norms still made it possible to contain default risks and drain financial 
flows towards access to credit and to influence the real sector of the Chadian economy? These 
are the preliminary questions that this article attempts to provide further clarification. In 
other terms, it is part of a dynamic to highlight the effects of bank capital on economic activity. 
It provides also a contribution in terms of literature on the Chadian financial system on the 
one hand and offers a framework for econometric analysis of the recapitalization of banks 
regarding financial development. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Prudential regulation policy aimed to ensure a financial structure not subject to moral hazard 
risks and excessive risk taking that could constitute an obstacle to the functioning of the 
financial system in general (Lacoue-labarthe, 2003). The goal is to allow banks in a financial 
system, in general to ensure the allocation of funds without harming productive investments 
and savings. It globally attracts management of macroeconomic shocks and financial 
instability (BCE, 2016). From a global and dynamic point of view, financial system 
restructuration must revive economic growth and thus promote financial development ( 
(Simon, 2003) (Mishkin, 2010)). 
The authorities in charge of regulating the banking system very quickly decided that bank 
capitalization was the cause of the systemic phenomena of the first financial crises. Banking 
regulation questions, before they became widespread at the international level, focused on 
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the issue of exchange rates and international bank failures ((Goodhart et al., 2011); (Gehrig, 
2013)). The first Basel standards adopted after the restructuring of the 1980s conditioned the 
banks to own capital equal to at least 8% of risk-weighted assets. However, the current 
objective of the prudential regulation is more accentuated on a sustainable competition 
between banks while disciplining them by the obligation to maintain an adequate 
capitalization at any time ( (Dewatripont & Tirole, 1993) (Lacoue-labarthe, 2003)) and 
financial stability (Bordes, 2013). Rochet (2003) proposes a competitive market and 
monopolistic competition to guarantee its efficiency. According to the models of the theory 
of industrial organizations, the SCP (Structure-Behavior-Performance) considers that market 
structure (particularly banks size, the concentration and the number of the offers) and banks 
behavior influence their performance (Dietsch, 1992). Equity was the target as it was intended 
to promote the financial stability and efficiency of banks (Pessarossi & Weill, 2015). In the 
United States already, the adoption of the "Glass Steagall Act" has protected the banks for 
almost 70 years from foreign competition. Banking concentration and banking competition 
evolve differently in a banking system, Nafisah et al., 2014), the rise in market shares 
(concentration) was accompanied by a proportional decline in competitive intensity, 
whatever the area. It can thus be a source of systemic risk or constraint to the financing of 
the economy (Allen, Beck, & Carletti, 2003). Stern & Feldman (2004) show that increased 
banking concentration leads to the birth of "too big to fail" and increases the difficulty and 
opacity of the banking system. Also, a somewhat concentrated banking market would reduce 
the regulator's work (Haldane & May, 2011). Indeed, the authority in charge of the regulation 
is obstinate only to control banks holding behaviors with the largest market shares, those 
likely to cause the banking system in a crisis (Dewatripont & Tirole, 1993). In the same vein, 
Berenger & Teiletche (2003), taking into account the second Basel agreement (Basle II), 
conclude a process of "creative destruction" due to the procyclical nature of regulatory capital 
( (Claessens, Dell'AAriccia, & Laevens , 2009) ; (Ouédraogo, 2014)) that banks can cope with 
(Allen, Beck, & Carletti, 2003). The procyclicality of bank capital arises as regulatory capital 
takes on a coexistent bearing on economic conjuncture. In the economic phase, whether 
favorable or not, banks in order to comply with banking regulations will be forced to restrict 
or ration credit or to increase the supply of credit and therefore to modify financial 
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development trend. Apart from Schumpeter's theoretical work (1911) and the inclusion of a 
monetary economy model in the real sector of the economy by Tobin (1965), several 
empirical studies had to follow to confirm the role of credit. Banking in economic recovery.  
Already, Bagehot (1873) empirically confirms the idea that the performance of British banks 
remains conditional on bank credits. The evolution of credit for Kaminsky & Reinhart (1999) 
makes it possible to implement a scenery of the cyclical trend of the economic conjuncture 
whether it is favorable or not. Trends in financial crises are accompanied by a slowdown in 
financial development followed by an upsurge in financial risks. For Simon (2003), the 
adoption of prudential norms alone reduced the level of economic growth to 13 points during 
the 1990s, thus significantly reducing the proportion of loanable funds to enterprises. Indeed, 
in return for the significant reduction of banking risks via the cyclical variation of banks capital, 
the primary sector of the economy in France has deteriorated considerably. Recent studies 
are examining the effects of new standards given in view of the appearance of new risks3 on 
the financing of economies and/or financial development. The results obtained from the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM4) and two (2sls) as three (3sls) stage least squares 
estimators relate to the effects of the probabilistic methods of determining capital and/ or 
regulatory capital. The constraint on the respect of prudential ratios (taking into account the 
internal and standard methods of determination of own funds to hold) modified the 
adjustment behavior of 27 banks in India and adversely affect the financial contribution to 
growth ( (Nag & Das, 2002) ; (Das, 2002)).  
However, thanks to the estimators of the two stage least squares, they conclude a double 
causality between taking risks and prudential norms. Qualified as "prophetic" standards by 
Nitsure (2005), thanks to the low level of financial development (around 40% of bank liquid 
assets finance growth), they have been able to contain trends in financial crises and their 
imported influences. Yellen (2011) and Reza (2011) propose for this state of affairs, a holding 
of the capital buffer or cousin of capital security to accompany financial development even in 
times of recession. 
                                                          
3 During the recent ratio adoption (McDonough ratio), authorities in charge of banking regulation of Basel judged 
necessary to add to the old ratio (Cooke) established in 1988’s, credit risk operational and market risks. The aim 
was to conduct banks to include in their managing functions the evolution of financial system and all inherent 
risks  
4 Allerano and Bond’s (1991) Generalized Method of Moments. 
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According to Goodhart & al. (2004), unlike the standard weighting method, the internal or 
probabilistic weighting of risks by rating agencies5 negatively influences the financing of 
emerging economies (United States, Norway, Great Britain, France, Mexico, Germany, Italy, 
Spain). Indeed, they analyze the behavior of banks over a period going from 1982 to 2003, 
and conclude, despite the positive effect of risk management under the internal weighting 
(increase in regulatory capital), asphyxiation of the supply of credit to the economy. Indeed, 
periods of recession suggest a high level of risk for economic agents. Banks, on the other 
hand, are likely to refinance the economy in the event of low risk or expansion period 
((Goodhart C., 2005) (Garabiol, 2006)). The financial contribution to the process of economic 
growth or financial development is a constraint on the behavior of the authority in charge of 
financial stability or prudential regulation. 
III. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CHADIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM  
 
A. Chadian banking system facing prudential standards 
 
For the Bank of Central African States (BEAC), less than half of the banks in the sub-region are 
out of line with prudential standards as a whole (BEAC, 2016). In fact, on the 52 banks 
operating in overall the region, the latest reports states that 25 banks approximated legal 
situation with prudential standards and 12 banks considered less risky against the other 40 
considered at risk. Unlike other countries, however, Chadian banks can be considered as 
"good" students of the authority in charge of prudential regulation. The revaluation of bank 
capital in 2009 to 10 billion, was not significantly a constraint for Chadian banks. Like other 
countries, the increase in capital is a function of the strong presence of international banks 
with a large foreign shareholding (Holdings). Also, the risky climate of the Chadian banking 
system leaves an increase in provisions for risk to 52% to reach 26 billion francs (COBAC, 
2010). In the same dynamic, compliance with the risk coverage ratio (capital ratio) has 
constantly been evolving for banks. The decline in profits or net banking income (GNP) 
observed (21%) by COBAC during this period, explains the reluctance of banks to raise the 
                                                          
5 standard and Poor’s, Moody’s et Fitch 
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level of lendable funds given the risky dynamics of the banking system. Most banks in the sub 
region, and particularly in Chad, account for a large proportion or are generally generated 
receivables (credits) granted to customers (at least 57%) and other types of transactions in 
their GNP. 
 
B. Financial Development and Banking Market Structure in Chad 
 
Noted that the CEMAC countries include in their financial systems specifically liquid banks 
with a marginal share of the economy. Despite the multitude of reasons given for this state 
of affairs, the riskiness of the clientele and the financial environment remains a constraint. 
The already disturbing evolution of the Herfindhal-Hirshman index regarding credit granted 
by the three (3) first banks shows (Figure 1) that banking activity in Chad is facing increasing 
volatility regarding the quest for market share. Over the period in question, and particularly 
before the banking of Chadian officials or householders, the competitive situation of the 
banking industry has improved considerably (trend decline of the HHI on the chart). Indeed, 
this downward trend of this index (at 18%) has evolved since 2005, was accompanied by a 
23% drop in the level of financial development and therefore the supply of credit to the 
economy before to stabilize somehow in 2007. Also, at the same time the economy was 
significantly slower, with a very low threshold of development and the random tendency of 
the level of concentration in the banking sector because of the warring rebel. However, the 
dynamism of this economy has allowed recovery from mid-2008. 
The year 2009 was marked by a prosperous development of macroeconomic aggregates in 
Chad and banking activities in general (raising banks' capital). We can easily see an upsurge 
of bank credit in growth and combined with an increase (from 0.15 point to 0.12 of the HHI) 
in the structure of the banking market (competitive market). The plausible explanation to 
bring outside the banking activity blast is thus related to the decision of the Chadian 
government to starts the process of banking all Chadian officials. Other exogenous facts, such 
as the degree of openness of the economy and the regulatory constraints already mentioned 
above, can contribute to these stylized facts intrinsic to the Chadian banking system. The 
increase of bank capital and the customer risks (credit losses and other) during the banking 
period marginally improved credit conditions. By accordance with the literature mentioned, 
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recapitalization should adopt a causal risk-capital sense and under the same conditions curb 
the real sector of the economy. 
 
Fig 1: Evolution of Chad HHI and Financial development in sub-Saharan and CEMAC  
 
Source: author from WDI and Central Bank data 
IV. METHODOLOGY  
 
The objective will be to test the implications of banking capital adjustment on financial 
development in Chad during two different periods consider as transitory. Specifically, it a way 
to make use of econometric robustness tests in order to understand if the prudential banking 
recapitalization norm is to manage bank risks or to accompany the financing of the Chadian 
economy. To guarantee the reliability of our results, we will use several estimates in panel 
data to estimate the link. 
 
A. Model specification 
 
Several pioneering works on financial development has highlighted the various implications 
of this concept for growth. Several variables of financial development made it possible to 
understand the sense of causality existing between macroeconomic aggregates (growth in 
particular) and financial development. Also, from the methodological point of view, most of 
the work has used a known Cobb-Douglas function, which is mainly justified by the presence 
of the GDP aggregate and the inherent explanatory variables of interest (Aka Brou, 2010). 
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Given the research hypotheses to be tested in this article, we will use as Shrieves & Dahl 
(1992) simultaneous equations to highlight the implications of the procyclical capital of US 
banks on banking risks. This model formalizes in a certain dimension the behavior of banks in 
situation of revaluation of capital under the constraint of the structure of the market (quest 
for market share) or the obligations of the authority in charge of the prudential regulation.  
In the context of this article, the meaning of causality is justified by the effects of discretionary 
capital on financial development. This causality can be double under certain tests (causality 
test). Therefore, the objective of this article is to update the trend of the implication of the 
revaluation of bank capital on the access to bank credit by sectors of the economy (household, 
businesses etc.). In other words, it is part of an approach to illustrate whether the behavior 
of Chadian banks in the period of revaluation of their equity facing banking risks or to promote 
access to credit. To do this, the empirical model for estimating the effects of the bank capital 
revaluation standard on the economy can be specified as follows: 
 
 
1,
2,
( ;Z ) (1)
( ; ; ) (2)
it it
it it
devf f capital
risk f capital devf Z


   
   
  
With Devf the variable measuring financial development and Zi,t control variables influencing 
financial development. The control variables consist of the inflation rate (Infl), the logarithm 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the degree of trade openness (Ouv) ( (Berthélemy & 
Varoudakis, 1998); (Aka Brou, 2010)) and finally the Herfindhal-Hirshman concentration index 
(HHI) and own funds reported to total assets of banks (RF). At this important level, it is 
important to reiterate, given the theoretical and empirical review of the variables of financial 
development, that the proxy variable for financial development chosen is the ratio of gross 
credit to GDP (CRE / GDP) (Mohamed, 2008). The variable Actif is given by the logarithm of 
the total asset. The banking capital (CAP) evolves in a discretionary way (banking capital 
adjusted according to the profitability of the bank considered) while under a constraint of a 
rule (social capital or minimum required). It will be taken into account for this variable the 
sum of equity and other assets reported in total assets. In the end, for this paper we consider 
as risk proxy, bad debts and outstanding debts of banks reported to their assets (Djimoudjiel, 
2018). The model to be estimated is therefore defined: 
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0 1 2 3 4 1 5 6 7 8 1,
0 1 2 3 1 4 5 6 7 8 2,
(3)
(4)
it it it it it it it it it it
it it it it it it it it it it
devf CAP risk GDP devf HHI Ouv RF Infl
risk CAP devf risk RF GDP Infl HHI Actif
         
         


            
            
1,it et 2,it  are errors terms associated respectively to equations (3) et (4). 
B. Descriptive statistics and estimation technique 
 
Our study base includes data on active banks in Chad from 2000 to 2015. Data from the BEAC 
database. The determination of the concentration variable (HHI) will be done by simple 
calculation according to the formula proposed in the literature (definition above). Also, for 
macroeconomic variables such as GDP, inflation rate and opening rate, they are collected on 
the WDI (World Development Indicators). 
The table 1 below, sort the statistics description of variables used in the model. It is show 
hence on 16 years (111 observations on Chadian banks), the mean level of financial 
development still weak while banking capitalization and defaults risks have increased 
significantly. Chadian banking market despite his concentration mean at 0.17 support or 
conduct unfortunately to a higher risked costumer behavior. (0.09) whereas banking capital 
raised discretionary or none (0.20). the substantial increasing of GDP (22.7) and inflation rates 
(3.34) means are more in our case explain by petroleum incomes which have extensively 
supported others economy sectors than financial.   
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DevF 111 5.19e-06 3.72e-06 06 0.0000172 
CAP 111 0.2033487 0.1755688 -0.1198276 0.9567186 
Risk 111 0.0926802 0.0857159 0 0.4230641 
GDP 111 22.69992 0.6983167 21.04901 23.35675 
Ouv 111 1.636328 1.699083 0.789321 8.956769 
RF 111 0.1924286 0.1672768 0.0483651 1.033271 
Infl 111 3.34412 6.597881 -8.97474 14.01821 
HHI 111 0.1756808 0.0408473 0.0539626 0.2380734 
 
Source: author from Central Bank data (2000 to 2015) 
                                                          
6 The value of this min due to lack of Union Bank of Africa’s (UBA) data on gross credit in 2009.  
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The estimation model deduced above (Equation 3 and 4) takes into account two simultaneous 
equations relating financial development and bank risk to choose the best estimator and to 
obtain robust results. Different equations depending on whether they are identified at the 
right level or over-identified is essential. The conditions of identification without any 
restriction on the coefficients bring out a sur-identify model consider our specification (Annex 
1). The presence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity of the errors justified by the 
various tests thus leads to the use of the Generalized Moment Method (GMM) of Blundel and 
Bond to correct this state of affairs in the empirical model. In the same way, the identification 
of our model gives the possibility of the use of Triple Least Squares and the estimators of SUR 
(Seemingly Unrelated Regression) develop by Zellner. 
The purpose of this article is to test the implications of banks' behavior in responding to 
regulatory constraints on financial development. Chad is one of the countries of Central Africa 
with a low level of financial integration and a low contribution of the financial sector to 
sectors of the economy. About Basel's prudential standards based on bank recapitalization 
for risk management, the increasing leveling of capital must promote competition in the 
market and finance the economy for this purpose. However, it is important to note that the 
Chadian financial system has experienced a transition phase influencing the level of financial 
development. The decision of the Chadian government in 2009 to bank the functionary is a 
significant effect on the process of financial development. For this fact, the estimation periods 
will be truncated to analyze the implications of the prudential norms before (2000-2008) and 
after the banking period (2009-2015). 
V.  RESULTS BEFORE OFFICIALS FINANCIAL INCLUSION PERIODS 
 
The process of financial development in Chad has took off since 2011 (Fig 1), whereas in 
previous years it was at its lowest level. This fact, this descriptive result, as seen from the 
statistics, confirms and explains the non-significance of the bank recapitalization variable 
concerning financial development in the pre-banking period. Unfortunately, bank capital 
adjustment is not intended to boost economic activity before the pre-banking period for 
Chadian officials. Also, it has largely been used to reduce the increase in the risk of doubtful 
debts and therefore bank failures. As other banks in CEMAC, Chadian banks are indeed taking 
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more risks, and recapitalize in the same sense as the increase in losses likely to receivables on 
customers (Djimoudjiel, 2018). For 1% change in bank capital corresponds to 10% risk of credit 
losses to be covered by the banks during the relevant year range. The results also indicate 
that the riskiness of the Chadian client conditions the behavior of banks to finance economic 
activity. Credence risks on customers affect therefore the financial development processes at 
5% level of significance. Despite the absence of robustness of this result, the coefficient 
related to the losses credence risks is very higher and important, just for 1% of risk increasing. 
While the banking commission ruled on a low concentration of the Chadian banking market 
already from 2002, the fall in the level of risks has slightly improved financial development. 
The constraint of owning capital about risk-weighted assets, despite being one of the key 
prerogatives of the regulatory authority, adversely affects financial development. Raising 
equity for the sole purpose of containing risks, however, reduces the chances of economic 
recovery via bank financing. An increase in the ratio can be explained by a bank assets growth 
or by a reduction in the risks related to receivables to the private sectors, to the government 
or customers. While banks must hold a level of capital based on the credit risks granted to 
customers, the risk aversion of bankers slows down financial development. This result 
however not robust, is obtain in most of studies as Ouédraogao S. (2014), Garba (2016), and 
Djimoudjiel (2018) analyzing empirically relationship between prudential standards and 
banking risks in developing countries and some sub-Saharan countries. While the inflationary 
process would favor the improvement of the bank’s ability to promote financial development, 
the domestic product negatively affects the latter. The results are robust regarding 
significance, then considering the same effects on financial development obtain through the 
GMM and SUR estimators. As a result, the added value of the Chadian economy would be 
explained to a large extent by non-financial aggregates or from other sectors of the economy. 
A situation of oligopolistic competition due to an improvement in the Herfindhal-Hirshman 
Index (HHI) has a negative impact on the contribution of the banking sector to the economic 
growth process. In other terms, in the pre-banking period a strong hold of the market shares 
of some banks (top 3 or 5) can restrict the supply of credit to the economy. Would an 
allocation of the customer base or the officials based on the choice of the latter (to be banked 
for this first case) impact the level of market shares to create competition? This interrogation 
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comes in the sense that the Chadian officials are free to choose the bank where their account 
will be domiciled. It should be understood that financial development was not significant 
between 2000 and 2008, given the risk that customers were showing in Chad, and the 
contribution regarding added value to other sectors of the economy. 
VI. RESULTS AFTER OFFICIALS FINANCIAL INCLUSION IN CHAD 
 
The post-2009 period, marked by a strong inclusion of Chadian households, naturally raised 
the level of financial development as anticipated by the expected effects. According to our 
two estimators, the difference in the capital variation is correspondingly and positively 
aligned with the economic recovery via the banking sector and therefore the supply of 
loanable funds at 10% of significance. This recapitalization is not inherent in the risks banks 
face. Unlike the previous cases, the change in capital improves the conditions for access to 
credit rather than reducing the harmful effects of bad debts. In spite of these results, the first 
question to which it is imperative to answer whether the choice made by officials or civil 
servants to choose their banks would restructure the structure of the banking market, the 
answer seems to be positive. The decision of the Chadian government to banking officials 
positively promoted financial development and improved bank shares. The inflationary 
process, the role of which is to boost or boost GDP, can lead to a marginally weak competition 
situation insofar as it is maintained. Unlike the previous conclusion, the HHI index improves 
in the same direction as the financial development process. Given the two estimators used to 
obtain these results, Chadian banks are more incentivized in return for the management of 
the credit risks or receivables losses, to attract the customers following the policy of 
bankability of officials. In the same conception of banking behavior, compliance with the 
standard of holding capital against risks is more akin to risk taking. In the same vision, banking 
revival activities created a financial moderated risky environment. An increase in equity of 
1%, although it does not condition the supply of credit to the financing of the economy, is 
explained by the upsurge in customer loan losses (by 5%). 
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VII. CONCLUSION  
 
The purpose of this article is to provide an explanatory framework for the contribution of the 
process of banking the Chadian officials (civil servants) to financial development in 
comparison with a pre-banking period. In other words, the main idea is to ask if, about 
theories, Chadian banks are adjusting their capital in the management of banking risks and 
the financing of the economy. It is focused on the assumption that the government's decision 
to include civil servants in the financial system promotes financial development. Indeed, for 
many authors the financial development the use of data from Chadian banks over a period 
from 2000 to 2015, truncated in two periods (2000-2008 and 2009-2015) allowed us to test 
this hypothesis. Hence, the results obtained showed an accentuation of the effects of the 
cyclical variation of the capital of the Chadian banks in the management of the risks before 
the banking period. While the post-financial inclusion period resulted in risk management 
reduction under the constraint of own funds according to bank rents. Also, during this period, 
the recapitalization of banks has significantly improved financial development. The rise in bad 
and bad debt losses is counteracting banks' efforts to finance the Chadian economy. The low 
concentration of the banking system despite its low coefficient explains significantly the 
improvement of the level of financial development. Also, the process of banking has led to an 
upsurge in risks and conditioning the financing of the economy via a less concentrated 
banking market. 
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IX.  ANNEX 
 
Annex 1: identification methods of the model and estimators  
- If  (g - g’) + (k - k’)  g – 1, equation is under-identify (OLS estimators) 
- If (g – g’) + (k – k’) = g – 1, equation is just-identify (Two least squares) 
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- If (g – g’) + (k – k’) > g – 1, equation is over-identify (required Three and two least 
square, Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimators) 
With  
- g : number of endogenous variables in the model (equation number)  
- k : exogenous variables in the model  ; 
- g’ : endogenous variables in the identify equation ; 
- k’ : exogenous variables in the equation to identify. 
 
Determination of our estimation model identification: 
 
 g g’ k k’ (g – g’) + (k – k’) g – 1 Type 
Equation (3) 2 1 8 7 2 1 Over-identify. 
Equation (4) 2 1 8 7 2 1 Over-identify 
   
Source : author  
Annex 2: GMM and SUR estimation results (2000-2008)) 
 GMM SUR 
  ΔDevF ΔRisk ΔDevF ΔRisk 
D.DevF 
 
-4762.853 
 
-7149.44* 
 (0.270) (0.068) 
D.CAP 4.67e-06 0.109983* 3.41e-06 0.11674  
 (0.210) (0.050) (0.181) (0.123) 
D.Risk -3.63e-06** 
 
-5.46e-06 
 
 (0.022) (0.202) 
GDP -3.90e-06* -0.030119 -3.16e-06 ** -0.034160 
 (0.051) (0.600) (0.036) (0.324) 
HHI  -0.000157** -1.41850 -0.00015*** -1.823088 
 (0.019) (0.632) (0.006) (0.261) 
Ouv -7.93e-08 
 
-5.89e-08 
 
 (0.395) (0.680) 
RF -6.62e-06* 0.041121 -4.37e-06  0.01605 
 (0.074) (0.845) (0.156) (0.915) 
Infl 2.27e-07*** 0.0013026 2.21e-07*** 0.001923 
   (0.006)  (0.482)    (0.000)  (0.201) 
Actif  -0.00690  -0.009673 
  (0.776)  (0.531) 
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L.DevF -0.3874* 
 
-0.28133 *** 
 
 (0.091) (0.002) 
L.Risk 
 
- 0.33665*** 
 
-0.33474*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Constante 0.0001208** 0.8216382 0.0001022** 1.241072 
 (0.037) (0.599) (0.021) (0.274) 
Test AR (2) (0.146) (0.141) 
Hansen test (1.000) (1.000) 
Sargan test (0.006) (0.101) 
Observations 48 48 48 48 
Banks 7 7 8 8 
RMSE 
 
1.53e-06 0.04394 
R-sq. 0.5257 0.3635 
Chi2  55.68 22.67 
Source: author  
Annex 3: GMM and SUR estimation results after financial inclusion of Chadian official’s 
(2009-2015) 
 GMM SUR 
 ΔDevF ΔRisk ΔDevF ΔRisk 
D.DevF  -6829.982  -10817.33** 
 (0.200)  (0.038) 
D.CAP 2.10e-06* -0.02698 2.07e-06* -0.019757 
 (0.093) (0.444) (0.084) (0.653) 
D.Risk -2.11e-06  -4.43e-06  
 (0.572) (0.218) 
GDP -1.42e-06 -0.028352 -1.41e-06 -0.05243 
 (0.307) (0.356) (0.419) (0.420) 
HHI  0.0000372*** 0.13745 0.0004***   0.3034 
 (0.001) (0.659)   (0.000) (0.281) 
Ouv -2.17e-06  -2.08e-06  
 (0.366) (0.352) 
RF -1.28e-07 0.2029431** -1.45e-08   0.20410** 
 (0.941) (0.028) (0.993) (0.016) 
Infl 1.04e-07** 0.0009535 1.06e-1*** 0 .0012051 
 (0.010) (0.332) (0.003) (0.342) 
Actif  0.0335032*  0.03600** 
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  (0.071)  (0.035) 
L.DevF 0.0685621  0.07151  
 (0.603) (0.494) 
L.Risk  -0.11616  -0.091885 
 (0.578) (0.378) 
Constante 0.0000297 0.241807 0.0003 0.7463091 
 (0.331) (0.738) (0.456) (0.598) 
Test AR (2) (0.239) (0.147) 
Hansen test (1.000) (1.000) 
Sargan test (0.043) (0.071) 
Observation 62 62 62 62 
Banks 7 7 8 8 
RMSE  1.39e-06 0.0495096 
R-sq. 0.4721 0.1124 
Chi2 57.62    9.72 
 
Source : author 
